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History taught us that Medieval Hum and Bosnia were repre-
sented by its noble rulers: from Prince Miroslav to Herzog
Stipan, from Ban Kulin to Stipan Tomašević. A numerous lower
gentry were active too. The Turkish occupation changed radi-
cally the society of Herzegovina and Bosnia. The power was
handed in to Turkish pashas, bays, and ‘aga’s, whilst the
Christian millets had their own noblemen who acted as
guardians of spirit and identity of their communities. The latter
included mainly the Orthodox and Catholic priests, but also
the local, popular princes of whose presence and activity we
find a witness in a 1551 letter from Pope Julius to two princi-
pals of Duvno (Dilecti filiis Comiti), Grga Lučić and Pavle
Vučković; the Pope informs them that he has acknowledged
their recommendations and appointed Fr Danijel Glasnović
from Split a bishop of Duvno Diocese. The conquered
Herzegovinan and Bosnian land turned into an Ottoman
(Sultan) property and was ruled by vezirs, bays, and agas.
The Christian landsmen cultivated the land they could not
own, and were not allowed to build on it, except for wall-
stones. They lived hard by cultivating the piece of land they
could plough by a pair of oxen. They paid high tax and were
not allowed to leave the land without permission. However,
they could have been ordered to move, and ‘their’ land con-
fiscated, at once. The Christians were allowed to work in min-
ing and as artisans serving the needs of the empire.
Depending on their significance and the (im)possibility of find-
ing a replacement for them, they could have earned some
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privilege. Some of them could have a church-bell or put cross-
es on their graves. In the literatures we find that ‘ćurčije’, the
Catholics from Dolac near Travnik, were amongst the most
trusted by the Ottoman rulers; their job was to mummify the
chopped heads of ‘rebels and disorder-makers’ before the
heads were posted to Istanbul. Such was the ultimate artistic
achievement of Bosnian Catholic artisans of the time. Bosnian
friars exerted the principal influence on Catholics. They
shaped the mentality of the population of which they were
guardians. As Fr Andrija Zirdum writes, friars did not have a
strict organisation, or hierarchy. The Franciscan province
‘Bosna Srebrena’ was functioning as a community of monas-
teries headed by guardians. As the Ottoman rulers did not
allow new arrivals of friars from abroad into Bosnia, only
domestic priests were included into a province. Moreover, for
security reasons, the visitors, who used to supervise the
province every third year, were not being sent from Rome, but
from within the very communities, which were left to them-
selves to build a highly specific modus vivendi and their own
microcosms.
Bosnian friar’s modus vivendi had its origins in Fr Andjelo
Zvizdović’s plea to the Sultan to remain in his homeland and
preach his faith, to which the Sultan responded by an act of
grace. It has its origins also in the cult of Queen Katarina, who
was expelled from Bosnia to die in Rome where by her testa-
ment she transferred her rights over the land to the Pope; and
its origins are also in the last Bosnian King Stipan about whom
the poet Nikola Šop said that he became so thin in front of a
‘padishaha’ [an Ottoman ruler] that he ‘melted through shack-
les into freedom.’ Such a way of living was based on a con-
tinuous search for compromise and ‘thin’-making for freedom,
and was promoted in Franciscan monasteries and their sur-
roundings, which required a lot of strength and wisdom but
was nonetheless the condition of survival. The survival of
monasteries, churches, friars, and people, depended on their
relationship with Turks. However, ‘Bosna Srebrena’ could not
have survived without many a sacrifice after which it always
managed to recover and survive. As the poet in Bosnia wrote,
‘Human being will not survive because s/he is strong; s/he will
survive because of its thinness, weakness, and the fear from
passing away.’
A large part of Christian population subsisted on a
nomadic economy, and by fleeing to mountains (or staying
there) and poverty they managed to preserve a kind of free-
dom and identity. They carried all their belongings with them,
preaching the faith in the open or in secluded spaces under


























builders, and all those who were making the necessities for
daily living. Such a modus of living created a special, individ-
ualist mentality, which did not develop a sense of common
work and was resistant to all kinds of community. There was
no a strong form of organisation, or leadership. If a leader
showed up that was merely due to a pressure, which is why,
when such a pressure was no more, his role became super-
fluous. The leaders were also the first ones to pay the bills of
those they were leading: by decapitation, a prison sentence,
or a property. Instead of putting forward the best, the commu-
nity used to put forward the worst to make their losses tolera-
ble, and sometimes also for the sake of making mockery with
the powerful by pressing on them some inconvenient part-
ners; this is how they signalled their low opinion about the
government as well as about some potential agreements.
In such a world, one relied on, and highly appreciated,
property, strength, and youth; stone-throwers, runners, grass-
cutters, and wrestlers were highly respected. Elderly was
cared for, women were judged both by their beauty and
strength. Mila of Gojsalić and Diva of Grabovac represented
the ideal of female heroines and female saints. That is how, in
Herzegovina and in the Venetian-Turkish boundary area
stretching from Livno to Trebinje, a different mentality was
generated that was nothing alike the Bosnian-friar mentality.
Such a mentality was formed in a continuous struggle, with
the church, monasteries, and other forms of a long-term asso-
ciation, absent. Turks have destroyed all the churches and
monasteries in Herzegovina, whilst the friars fled together with
the people to Dalmatia where new churches were built. The
friars who served those few remaining Christians were com-
ing from Živogošće, Zaostrog, and Poljice. Soon they request-
ed from Rome to disassociate them with the Bosnian province
because such an enslaved province should not rule over them
who were free.
Such were the origins of the mentality which never came
to terms with a foreign rule (it was always a foreign one).
Repetitive wars, military incursions, and city-siege shaped
such mentality too. All were engaged in such wars including
the herdsmen and the brightest friars. Andrija Kačić wrote
poems about the wars and the warriors who were also
accounted by Fr Pavle Šilobadović in his Libretin; one of the
latter’s typical lines goes as follows: ‘Year 1666, month August
22 – Marko Sovićanin, supported by no more than 12 com-
rades, brought 6 Turk prisoners and cut 3 in Rama. Ours are
well, Th(ank) G(od)!’ Fr Lovre Šitović nicknamed ‘Ljubušak’
took an active part in the struggles for the liberation of

























ter sorrow when his mother, who was a Moslem, refused both
to join him on his way to Dalmatia and to convert to
Christianity. As much he was strong in his faith so much was
she strong in her own; hence maternal love was itself insuffi-
cient to pull down the walls that stood between them. Fr Lovre
knew that such walls were getting harder and bigger by the
folk songs that glorified rebels and outcasts, which is why he
fiercely opposed them. However, glorification of Mijat Tomić
and Andrijica Šimić, the heroes who fought the foreigners,
robbed the rich, and helped the poor, encouraged the poor to
survive and raised some hopes about a better future.
Such Herzegovinian kind of life implied a continuous
struggle and non-submissiveness, and helped to create a
mentality of distrust and steadfast resistance to any change
and anything that comes from without the narrow community.
In contrast to Catholics whose seat was in Rome, whilst for
Herzegovinians both friars and monasteries remained in the
Venetian lands for a long time, the Orthodox Christians of
Bosnia-Herzegovina enjoyed a more favourable position. In
1557 Ottomans allowed them to restore their patriarchy, which
led to their increased self-awareness giving rise to an
increase in the number of official titles they were putting on
themselves. Patriarch Makarije Sokolović, the first cousin of
Mehmed-Pasha Sokolović, declared himself ‘the Arch-epis-
cope and patriarch of the entire Serb land, of the Western
Coastal Area and of Northern Realms.’ The Orthodox priests
made use of their favourable position and tried to suppress
Catholics against which the latter resisted unswervingly.
However, the relationships between the Orthodox Christians
and Turks deteriorated in 18th and especially 19th century
after the former endorsed an anti-Turkish policy of both
Russia and Austria.
The 19th century saw an accelerated decline of the
Ottoman Empire. After a series of uprisings, Serbia restored
its independent statehood in the form of a vassal principality,
and its newly established elite started drawing plans about the
expansion of its influence to Herzegovina and Bosnia. In fall
of 1844 one of the Serb noblemen and politicians, Ilija
Garašanin, forecast a further decline of the Ottoman Empire,
and, influenced by the Polish and Bohemian political thought,
drew a Serb national program called ‘Načertanije’ [A Project].
Garašanin counted on sympathies that the Christians of
Herzegovina and Bosnia had towards the Serb political and
military success; his aim was to exploit such sympathies to
expand the principality to the territories of Herzegovina and
Bosnia. One of Garašanin’s key principles was that the princi-


























an enduring and firm bond between Serbia and the Serbs who
lived in the neighbourhood of Serbia. Otherwise, Serbs would
be internally divided into many small principalities ruled by the
families susceptible to a foreign influence that would envy,
and compete with, each other.
Garašanin also counted on full freedom of faiths, and
sought an agreement with Catholics concerning the popular
politics. He also figured out a way to sever the attachments
Catholics in Herzegovina and Bosnia had towards Austria and
to ally them instead with Serbia. In his opinion, one could have
done it by influencing the Catholic friars whose books would
be published in Belgrade, and some of them would be
appointed to the Belgrade University to act as intermediaries
between Serbs and Catholics of Bosnia. As he proposed, it
would be good to build a chapel or two for them that would
stand under auspices of the French consul, which would pre-
vent Austria’s influence. The Serb principality managed to
evoke some sympathies in a part of the Bosnian friars. They
saw in it a hope of liberation from Turks, and, politically speak-
ing, the first precursors of modernisation were coming from it
to Bosnia. Approximately at the same time, Fr Ivan Frano
Jukić wrote a letter to Port on behalf of all the Christians, and
demanded that they be not called or considered ‘raya’ [plebs]
anymore, but the citizens of the empire. This was one of the
first public attempts to leave the Sultan’s embrace. A bit later,
Don Ivan Musić organised an uprising against Turks in
Gabela, which spread along the border and marked the end of
the Ottoman Empire. Following the failure of the uprising, the
Serbian influence diminished, and the bonds with the West
were re-established. In addition to friars, the first representa-
tives of the citizenry started appearing on the scene. However,
both the former and the latter orientated themselves towards
Zagreb, Pest, and Vienna.
Unhappy with the condition of the neighbourhood, and
convinced that the empire was getting increasingly weak, the
Bosnian Moslem noblemen stood up against the Ottoman
reforms that were supposed to place the Christian rights on an
equal footing with the Moslem rights. A mystic and poet from
Žepa, Abdulvehbab Ilhamija, wrote the following verses to
depict the conditions of his society: Strange troubles occurred,
all have into baddies turned, and a herd of enemy up-turned:
What one wants, for God’s sake? The Moslem elite started re-
positioning. Those firmer and more determined to defend their
positions came to the forefront. Many refugees from Serbia,
and other lost territories, closed ranks with them to acquire
more secure positions in a new surrounding by an emphatic
























the struggle between the proponents of autonomy, on the one
hand, and the advocates of Sultan, on the other: family
Gradaščević in Posavina, family Glodje in Sarajevo, and fam-
ily Rizvanbegović in Herzegovina.
By a military retribution of Omer-pasha Latas, Bosnia
remained without its strong men, and Herzegovina lost its sta-
tus of an independent ‘pashaluk’ [pasha-dom], or a province of
the Empire. Reforms did not work, the condition of the state
was deteriorating, and violence and poverty were on increase.
The then ‘international community’ headed by England decid-
ed at 1878 Vienna Congress to authorise the Austria-
Hungarian army to move into Bosnia to restore the peace and
order. The Moslem population experienced a shock as, by the
will of the others, it turned from a dominant and ruling people
into a minority within a Christian state, as Šaćir Filandra points
out. Following a failed resistance, a part of the Moslem elite
fled to Turkey, whilst those who remained tried to adapt them-
selves to the new circumstance and the life within a circle of
the Christian civilisation. The new situation implies a loss of
the largest part of privileges enjoyed within the former feudal
system that was based on a state-religion and the Sultan’s
grace. Knowledge, or property that took place of oriental titu-
larity, became a new value that secured positions within the
state administration. Austria-Hungarian government retained
the feudal ownership rights, but transformed them into the
modern property rights. The new government also calculated
that the ‘Mohammad-an’ population had the best sense for the
state affairs, and was therefore the most suitable for the posi-
tions within the state administration. Hence the new elite was
being created from the domestic and the newly arrived
employees of the state administration which served the ‘K und
K’ monarchy. Mehmed Bay Kapetanović - ‘Ljubušak’ was its
foremost representatives. Dr Srećko Džaja has explored and
described in detail the creation of the new elite, and especial-
ly of the BiH intelligentsia during the Austria-Hungarian age.
In 1881, in addition to both Bosnian and Herzegovinian fri-
ars, who have just seceded from the Bosnian friars, the
Catholics have seen the establishment of Diocese headed by
‘Vrh-Bosna’ Archbishop Josip Stadler. Fr Marijan Markovic
was appointed the head of the newly established Banja Luka
Diocese, whilst Fr Paskal Buconjic was appointed the head of
Mostar-Duvno Diocese. This marked a beginning of a rejuve-
nated influence of the Universal Catholic Church that was
absent over the previous four centuries; it also marked a true
beginning of modernisation and development of a civil socie-
ty. Despite all the problems the monarchy faced, or generated


























sation of Herzegovina and Bosnia that the then Austria-
Hungarian government decided to unite in the form of a
unique Austria-Hungarian province ‘Bosna i Hercegovina’ to
be ruled by the Parliament and the Lands-Government.
However, wherever there is a monarch, there are also those
who wish to dethrone him. Assassination of the Austrian
prince-regent Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo marked a begin-
ning of the war in the course of which the monarchy disinte-
grated, whilst Bosnia-Herzegovina was consigned to the
newly established Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
(Yugoslavia) whose throne was occupied by the ‘king unifier’
Alexandar Karadjordjević.
The new Yugoslav elite was built on the ruins of the
Austria-Hungarian. Like erstwhile Polish, Czech, Slovene,
Slavonian, Dalmatian and other ‘single-bag holding immi-
grants and settlers’ from the monarchy, such immigrants and
settlers this time massively moved from Serbia to Bosnia-
Herzegovina. This time the number of physicians, museum
supervisors, and engineers decreased and their place was
taken by an increased number of military, gendarmes, and
financial police officers who quickly spread their net over the
‘extended homeland’ founding the new Yugoslav state elite.
By a nationalisation a largest part of the land property was
taken from the Moslem Beys. A part of them has adopted the
modernisation processes during the Austria-Hungarian age;
they or their children graduated from the schools in Vienna
and other royal universities, and thus kept their social posi-
tions regardless of their previous financial and economic situ-
ation. Another part was in financial ruins, but it managed to
retain some influence over the society by invoking ‘the glori-
ous past’, occupying thus the element of public opinion and
influence we colloquially call ‘čaršija’ [small urban element].
During this period Serbs have formed an elite who was run-
ning Yugoslavia: beginning with the royal house who estab-
lished links with the European royal courts, and including also
civic politicians educated at the European centres. Many mer-
chants, military, state administration officers, university and
high school professors, writers, journalists, and village teach-
ers were included too. A part of Croat and Moslem elite took
part in the creation of Yugoslavia. Convinced about the
strength of the Serb nationalism, they attempted to soften
such nationalism by Yugoslav-hood as well as to bridge the
differences and create the conditions for both political and cul-
tural association with Serbs. Otherwise, they simply endorsed
the newly formed government together with its ideas at least
until the government ceases to exist. A part of them remained
























whilst a part of them was dissatisfied with both their own and
their people’s position, and consequently took an opportunity
offered by the multi-party parliamentary system and initiated
their national projects including Radić’s republicanism and
Spaho’s project of autonomy. Many have paid by their lives or
imprisonment their struggle for redistribution of power that
was sometimes taking more cooperative forms and was
sometimes giving rise to an open confrontation.
The returnees from the Russian prisons, too, took part in
the struggles for the positions within the Yugoslav Kingdom;
they were stuffed with the Bolshevik ideas and well paid by the
Communist International Movement. They let the government
know that they would fight by all the means available includ-
ing primarily the revolutionary terror; they organised attempts
at royal ministers, but also fought and killed each other strug-
gling for the functions to which Moscow would assign them
after they managed to demonstrate their full commitment,
devotion, and brutality. Crime was, of course, the best demon-
stration, and a partnership in crime was strengthening the
bonds of the Bolshevik organisation. Protected by the
USSSR, and taking opportunity of the civil war that lasted for
four years, in which the Yugoslav elites evinced fully their mis-
erable character, at the end of the war the Communists turned
up well organised and in possession of a huge military power.
In the aftermath of the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina the
Communists have killed all their political enemies, primarily
and especially those of the Croat origin, including the individ-
uals who have not been, but could have become, an enemy:
friars, priests, civic politicians, professors, merchants, guest-
house owners, kulaks…all the reactionaries and those who
the reactionaries may rely on. Some have managed to escape
the terror by emigrating. A large community of Croat emi-
grants, who retained the memories of the homeland as it was
left behind, was formed abroad. A part of the community was
politically active in a large number of emigrant political parties
and organisations.
Serbs were a majority of the leading communists of the
BiH to whom the largest portion of the Moslem elite joined;
Croats were given a secondary role to keep up the appear-
ance of national balance. The twenty years of post-war dicta-
torship saw the formation of a new communist elite composed
mainly of the rural and poor people with a minimum of educa-
tion that was supplemented with night schools and party
courses. They occupied various positions and moved into
‘nationalised’ apartments of the ‘liberated’ cities; they also
defended their new positions by showing an utter contempt for


























from. They emphasised time and again that there would be no
return to the old ages, referred to their rule as ‘the present’,
and labelled all those outside their ranks as ‘reactionaries.’
However, the party leadership realised that the road they have
taken does not lead to socialism. Reforms were required, and
reforms started with the 8th Congress of the Communist Party
of Yugoslavia held in December 1964. The first condition of
the reforms was to condemn, and bring an end to, sectarian-
ism, which was an euphemism for ‘national chauvinism.’ That
is how a number of Croats from Bosnia-Herzegovina was
given a permission to join the revolutionary society of the elite.
A group around Franjo Herljević gained in strength at the fed-
eral level, whilst a group around Branko Mikulić did the same
at the level of the republic [of BiH]; the party municipal portfo-
lios were assigned to numerous careerists with poor CVs, with
no revolutionary record, and an experience of a few weeks of
lying beneath a pine in an ambush against a desperate neigh-
bour who was hiding from ‘the present’ in all kinds of cliffs.
After the fall of Ranković, the Mostar congress, and as a
part of overall social processes, the party terror was receding,
and an increased number of Croats came to terms with the
softened hand of the communist power, held the extended
hand, and accepted a party membership and participation in
the government. Something like an excuse, or apology, was
heard amongst Croats often those days, that one needs to join
the party because ‘our people’ should be there, that all the
positions will be otherwise occupied by ‘theirs’, and similar.
Communists, however, showed a lot of skill in managing the
processes of differentiation and of separating the ‘healthy
potential’ from ‘the reactionaries’. They were leaving no space
for a political mimicry, emphasising very clearly that those who
were not with them were against them; and that is how ‘ours’
have quickly become ‘theirs.’ Following the death of Tito, his
followers were pledging that Tito would remain even after Tito,
meaning that nothing would change. But, the changes taking
place in Europe, the weakening and the ultimate fall of the
communist system, led to the fall of Yugoslav communism too.
Despite a hard struggle for political monopoly, the BiH
communists’ faith in their political strength and influence has
not receded, and they readily decided to comply with the calls
for democratic, multi-party elections. In 1991 they suffered
such a landslide defeat that their political and parliamentary
representation carried no weight or relevance. But, who has
defeated them so convincingly, and which force has managed
to annul the half of the century devoted to a systematic con-
struction of the system that enjoyed monopoly over ideas, pol-
























etrated all the layers of the society and seemed both unbreak-
able and irreplaceable? It seems that there was not any huge
force. The system spent itself and self-collapsed; nationalism
arose as an alternative with enough force to bring the com-
munist totalitarianism to an end. It will be interesting to see
who assumed the leadership positions in the national move-
ments within the BiH, how the national elite was formed, and
which path did they take.
The Serb national elite grouped around ‘Srpska
Demokratska Stranka’ [Serb Democratic Party] (SDS). Its
leadership was composed of an elected part of the Serb elite
that was formed in the communist system and recruited
amongst the professors of Sarajevo University, especially the
Faculty of Philosophy, and also amongst the members of the
Academy of Sciences and Arts of the BiH, the Union of
Writers…Dr. Radovan Karadžić was elected the President of
SDS, whilst professors Dr Nikola Koljević and Dr Biljana
Plavšić were elected into the BiH Presidency. Within the SDS
system, various roles were performed by professors Dr Aleksa
Buha, Dr Milorad Ekmečić, Dr Vojo Maksimović, academy
member Slavko Leovac…
The Croat elite grouped around ‘Hrvatska Demokratska
Zajednica BiH’ [Croat Democratic Union of the BiH] (HDZ
BiH), which had a very colourful composition and was gath-
ered from a variety of sources. It included general practition-
ers, home construction entrepreneurs, retired higher school
professors, and people with fresh bachelor degrees. Dr Davor
Perinović, an orthopaedist and Sarajevo physician, was the
first president of the party; as he himself later announced in an
interview, he was ‘the only Serb elected for a president of a
Croat party.’ In a Zagreb weekly he publicly accused the
Bosnian friars of being worse than communists, and thereby
seriously undermined his own position. Such a misplaced
remark gave the first indication that Perinović was a disturbed
and confrontational personality, and subsequently he was
removed from the leadership position. Stjepan Kljujić, sports-
journalists from Sarajevo (and a secondary school degree),
was appointed an acting president of the party. Ivan Markešić,
a cousin of Fr Luka Markešić, who was a former Head of the
Franciscan Province of ‘Bosna Srebrena’, was appointed
General Secretary of HDZ. Kljujić was also elected into the
BiH Presidency, whilst Franjo Boras, a former political prison-
er, pensioner, and by then an absolute outsider for the elec-
torate, was another Croat elected into the BiH Presidency. In
addition to the two, the leadership positions of the party were
taken by Ivan Bender, Abid Hodžić, Anto Baković, and others


























any, political experience at local levels, had no ability to think
strategically, and had no public influence.
The Moslem elite grouped around ‘Stranka Demokratske
Akcije’ [The Party of Democratic Action] (SDA) with Alija
Izetbegović, a former convict, a member of Young Moslems,
and the major defendant in so-called ‘Sarajevo 1983 pro-
ceedings’, elected as the president of the party. Adil
Zulfikarpašić, a long term émigré and wealthy man, and Dr
Muhamed Filipović were elected the vice-presidents of the
party; the latter has been a professor at Sarajevo University, a
founder of Moslem Forum, an human right organisation for
Moslems, and a popular nationalist at least since the 1960s.
Fikret Abdić, a former member of the BiH Communist Party
Central Committee and a former Agrokomerc Director who
was just released from a prison, has taken a leadership posi-
tion of the party, together with professor Dr Rusmir
Mahmutćehajić, professor Dr Ejup Ganić and others. Today’s
‘rais’ of the Islamic Community of the BiH, Dr Mustafa Cerić,
was sitting in the initial executive board of the party too. After
the elections, Abdić, Ganić, and Izetbegović were elected into
the BiH Presidency; Izetbegović was also elected the Chair of
the BiH Presidency. It is interesting to note that the Presidency
was composed of seven members, two for each constituent
people, and one from ‘others’; ‘others’ were in this case rep-
resented by Dr Ejup Ganić who was born in Sandžak, in
Serbia/Monte Negro, and was a representative of Yugoslavs.
Soon after the elections, it became clear that Ganić was one
of the most radical leaders of SDA.
A very brief and superficial insight into the leadership pro-
files of the parties reveals that the HDZ was both politically
and intellectually inferior to the other two. Since the very
founding of the party, it was clear that the then leading intel-
lectuals, with the exception of Dr Vitomir Lukić, did not wish to
join the HDZ. Inferiority of the HDZ became also manifest
through continuous dismissals, and replacements, of its pres-
idents: Perinović, Kljujić, Brkić, Boban, Kordić, Rajić, Jelavić,
and Čolak. Whilst the HDZ changed seven presidents within
the period of eight years, throughout that same period
Izetbegović remained the president of SDA, and Karadžić
remained the SDS president up until his enforced removal.
The only continuity in the work of HDZ of that time was
their connection with the official Zagreb and the latter’s influ-
ence over it, which should not be overestimated. Following the
5th Congress of the Party, and death of both Gojko Šušak and
Franjo Tudjman, Zagreb’s influence was significantly dimin-
ished; however, following the January 2000 elections in
























became negligible. The 5th Congress of HDZ was convened
in Mostar in May 1998, which represented another juncture in
the politics of the party. In a very loaded atmosphere of a coup
d’état, Ante Jelavić, a former JNA sergeant and wartime Head
of HVO [Croat Defence Council] for military logistics, who in
1998 served as a defence minister of the BiH Federation
Government, was elected the HDZ president with a huge sup-
port of parts of HVO professional brigades and a number of fri-
ars. During his reign, the party was fully cleansed of those
who have not sided with ‘the new leadership.’ The then BiH
Presidency member and a former BiH Federation President,
Krešimir Zubak, founded ‘Nova Hrvatska Inicijativa’ [New
Croat Initiative] (NHI), a party which, in coalition with former
communists, the party of SDP (Social-Democratic Party),
formed a government and governed for some time; however,
for the reason of such coalition-making NHI soon lost the
remains of trust that electorate had in it, and subsequently
was fragmented and marginalised.
After a period of time, Dr Jadranko Prlić and Neven Tomić,
together with a few other members of HDZ-techno-manageri-
al circle, were removed from the HDZ too; they started play-
ing on the card of civility, which bought for them a temporary
support of the international community, but also contributed to
their loss of credibility. The Croat public and electorate saw in
their vague and unconvincing statements a mere assistant-
voice to SDP, or an echo of the voice of various international
organisations; the same destiny befell ‘Hrvatska Seljačka
Stranka’ (HSS) and ‘Hrvatsko Nacionalno Vijeće’ (HNV).
The politics represented by Jelavić boiled down to two
verbs: to appropriate and to take over. They were appropriat-
ing institutions and material goods; and they were taking over
(corrupting) people. They founded the Herzegovina Bank and
insurance company, whilst over a very short period of time a
bunch of former lower officers, policemen, qualified workers
and minor managers, managed to occupy all the major politi-
cal and economic positions including the management of
Mostar Croat National Theatre that was then being set up.
The same people automatically occupied the leading posi-
tions within the HDZ. One should not have waited too long to
see how the new apparatchiks bring an already extremely
weak Croat political position within the BiH to ruins.
After the adventure with Croat ‘self-rule’, the tanks and
special troops of the International Force broke into the prem-
ises of the Herzegovina bank in such a way that it is still diffi-
cult to say whether they have robbed it, or tried to prevent its
abuse and ‘gather the evidence’ to confirm their assumptions.


























in the way of which Ranković of his best years would be envi-
ous. The process of removing of Jelavić’s (or God knows
whose) cadre is today being brought to completion by an
indictment launched against a former director of Mostar mili-
tary industry company Soko and a former BiH Presidency
member, Dragan Čović. His removal, which coincided with the
Christmas days, motivated Čović to compare himself with
Jesus and to promise that he would be resurrected at least for
the sake of Bosnia that the powerful would try to dismantle in
his absence.
Following the removals and dismissals, the HDZ was left
with old, exhausted, tired, and spent members, on the one
hand, and with inexperienced, incapable, ignorant, and poor
minded, on the other; the latter are unable to solve problems
and used to obey, not to take responsibility. Their politics is all
about retaining the acquired positions at any price, and per-
haps move a bit up the ladder, and waiting for a Messiah who
would show up, take over the party, and solve all the prob-
lems. A large part of them also look for a diploma to get a
cover for keeping their jobs. Those who were employed as
early as yesterday, to get whatever source of financial sup-
port, are now supposed to respond to increasingly complex
social problems and challenges? Their common response is
weeping, seeking and designating ‘the enemies of the Croat
people’ who are to be blamed for ‘our position which is worse
than ever before.’ Not knowing what to do with them or with
themselves, their political and other mentors are now swear-
ing and weeping together with them. A journalist and writer,
Petar Miloš writes, with sarcasm, that until recently people
were trying to find a charismatic individual to inspire them and
give them hope: priests, rebels, politicians…nowadays, those
supposed to give them a comfort, or consolation, are weeping
together with the people. Politicians, journalists, intellectuals,
academics, priests, bishops, even cardinal, are all weeping.
And the confused people asked the question about the nature
of our age: the people were weeping, whilst you have provid-
ed some consolation? This may be the best illustration of the
present condition of the Croat (political) elite in Bosnia-
Heregovina.
Bosniac-Moslem elite is divided into three big a series of
smaller parties. SDA is the biggest and the most influential,
and it currently in power. Following the death of Alija
Izetbegović, the party is led by a group of his most devoted
followers including his son Bakir. ‘Stranka za BiH’ [Party for
the BiH] is the second biggest Bosniac-Moslem party founded
by Haris Silajdžić, a former secretary of the ‘rais’ of the Islamic
























the wartime. Burdened by many affairs, including a multi-mil-
lion debt to the Pakistani government and various finance-
related and media controversies, Silajdžić intended to portray
himself as a modern European politician. However, oftentimes
the true Silajdčić appeared through his mask, for instance
when he stated that the Croats in Mostar have themselves
planted the terror bomb just to make it hard for Bosniacs. As
a majority of Bosniac-Moslem politicians, he takes upon him-
self the right to judge the patriotism of the others, to give ‘cre-
dentials’ for Bosnian-hood, and to judge who loves Bosnia
and who does not. He on his part manifests his love of Bosnia
from Turkey where he has been living ever since the interna-
tional community pressed him to step down from the position
of the president of his party.
The politics of his party relies on a civic-liberal rhetoric, but
in reality it is emphatically nationalistic; its goal is to ‘take over’
as many companies as possible and place them into Bosniac
hands, and to destroy whatever is left over. One of SDA
founders, and the leader of the party’s right wing, Omer
Behmen stated that ‘Stranka za BiH’ is the party of calculators
and profiteers.
However, one thing is common to all the major Bosniac-
Moslem parties – they advocate a ‘civic’ Bosnia (normally they
do not refer to Herzegovina, but they say that they mean it too
by ‘Bosnia’). Political profile of such ‘civic politics’ is best illus-
trated by the statement of two members of the Bosniac-
Moslem elite. In a April 1993 weekly issue of the daily
Oslobodjenje, Adil Zulfikarpašić tried to justify his politics of ‘a
historical agreement between Moslems and Serbs’, and
claimed that such an agreement represented a solution of the
dilemma of ‘peace or war’, and that such a peace with
Karadžić and Milošević gave Moslems the chance to solve all
their problems peacefully: they were, according to
Zulfikarpašić, on a road to become a 60% majority in the BiH
within the period of ten year after which they would become
sovereign rulers of the state.
A writer Abdulah Sidran has issued the second illustrative
statement; in his recollections about Alija Izetbegović he stat-
ed that Alija managed to return the name to his people; now
they should return the name to their land/country. In other
words, Bosniac people programmed to live in its Bosniac
country where they would have a 60% majority. Of course, this
narrative programme is wrapped into a liberal rhetoric refer-
ring to all kinds of human rights; and entities, cantons, or any
other nation-based, or ethnically marked, institutions, are an
impediment to such a programme. Today’s Sarajevo gives a


























Bosnia of tomorrow; the city is ruled by Bosniacs and
Moslems represent some multi-ethnic ingredient.
Apart from the few aforementioned Bosniac-Moslems
politicians from the first ranks of the SDA, some of them are
operating in a different way, outside of the party political agen-
da. Rusmir Mahmutćehajić was one of the closest associates
of Alija Izetbegović for the first years of the latter’s rule; he was
a kind of ‘Josip Manolić of Bosniac-Moslem politics’ who left
the party (just like Manolić and Mesić), and turned into a crit-
ic of Izetbegović’s politics. Mahmutćehajić turned from a mili-
tant Islamist and Bosniac nationalist into an advocate of a
civic form of the BiH political constitution the essence of which
consists in the principle of ‘single voter single vote.’ He has
been articulating his ideas through an organisation Forum
Bosna cooperating with a number of Croat intellectuals.
Muhamed Filipović advocates similar ideas, but in a less
intelligent or successful ways. Adil Zulfikarpašić took a differ-
ent direction. A couple of years ago his Bosniac Institute,
founded in Switzerland, moved to freshly built premises in
Sarajevo. Zulfikarpašić recently took the title of ‘Bey’, and in
April 2005 founded a Senate as a special body composed of
100 Bosniac-Moslem senators who will take care of the
Bosniac culture, politics, identity…A feudal discourse prac-
ticed by Adil Bey indicates the direction in which such efforts
go; but such a direction is also indicated by the fact that Zlatko
Lagumdžija, the leader of the avant-garde of the proletariat
and the SDP president, joined Adil, the representative and
personification of the Bosniac Turkophile elite, and was
appointed the vice-president of the Bey’s Senate.
Lagumdžija is the president of the third party in which
Bosniac-Moslems play the key role. His party too is trying to
portray itself as a civic party, as a party that, by its program-
matic goals and politics, stands opposed to the nationalist par-
ties. However, SDP is a successor of the Communist Union
that disintegrated along the ethnic lines and failed both to
overcome the national differences and resolve the national
issue; the same destiny befell SDP that failed to transform its
leadership, or membership, into truly civic democrats. This is
pertinently illustrated by the fact that the first president of the
party, Nijaz Duraković, after his resignation from the position
of the leader of ‘the avant-garde of all our peoples’, continued
his career as a columnist in a pro-Bosniac, nationalistic week-
ly that has by now lost all its influence. Due to his historical
contributions, he too was let by Adil Bey to join the Bosniac
senators. In harmony with the Marxist philosophy that repre-
sents a composition of the best elements of human history,
























‘national liberation war’ mixed with the elements of ‘the strug-
gle against aggression [against the BiH].’ SDP declared itself
to be a successor of all the historical values and a sympathis-
er of all the victims of the last two wars. They offered their sac-
rifice in Sutjeska, Neretva, Markale, Ahmići, and Tuzla; their
humanism and love of democracy has no ends, whilst the
responsibility for Bleiburg, Kazani, Srebrenica, or Grabovica,
must be taken by the others.
An ideological foundation for this part of social and politi-
cal scene was provided by the faculties of political science,
and various Marxist centres, that were in fact denunciating
science and selling an ideological ‘mist’ that, unopposed by
fresh winds of change, increasingly turned into a thick fog. It
would be difficult to explain to all the experts for a self-man-
aging socialism, to the analysts of the first and second 5-year
plan, to all the experts from self-managing interest-communi-
ties, communities of the associated labour, the combatants
against anti-socialist activities and anti-communist ideologies,
to the censors whose greatest virtue was alertness, that their
knowledge and skill was of no use, but one should try to do
so. But, who will do so? Definitely not their ‘nationally awaken’
and ‘now sober’ comrades grouped around Vijeće Kongresa
Bošnjackih Intelektualaca [The Council of the Congregation of
Bosniac Intellectuals] (VKBI), because VKBI-members,1 like
the members of non-existent Croat academy or the Serb aca-
demics, offer nothing new; with the persistence and determi-
nation, which is characteristic of the elderly, they do nothing
but repeat the ‘old and for us useful stories’.
It is regrettable when VKBI claim that Young Moslems
were the fighters for religious freedoms (in plural), or that
Bosnia does not need a European democracy, because the
age of the Ottoman Empire provided an ultimate paradigm of
democracy and multiculturalism that Europe will not reach for
a long time. By way of a joke, one could say that the political
part of the Bosniac elite can be divided into three groups:
‘Vahabiti’ who operate within the SDP and the 99 Circle (in
1934, in Sremska Mitrovica prison, Moša Pijade called
‘vahabiti’ a radical group within the Yugoslav Communist Party
led by Petko Miletić-Šepo); ‘VeKaBI’ who represent the
Bosniac national intellectuals engaged in VKBI; and ‘Vekhabi’
who operate from the position of a radical political Islam. The



























1. The author plays with the sound of ‘VKBI-members’, which is similar to
‘‘Vekhabi’-members’ who represent one of the most extreme Islamic sects
founded in Saudi Arabia; it is impossible to find a good equivalent for this pun
in English language [the translator].
limits, and they have the exclusive right to judge to what
extent ‘the others love or do not love Bosnia’, that is, to what
extent the others are Bosnia-oriented.
This is fine, but one should emphatically emphasise that
Bosnia-Herzegovina is best loved when one lives in it and
works for it, which would not deprive those who live in Zagreb,
Belgrade, London etc., of the right to love Bosnia; however,
one would thus dispense with an unnecessary caricature,
pathetic, and abuse. Namely, it has become too obvious that
there are too many ‘cosmopolitans’ who ‘love Bosnia’ and its
poor people very much, and love it more than their own coun-
tries in which they ‘live well;’ but, they live on Bosnia and by
searching in it for fascism, fascists, terror and terrorists, and
by making of it a good testing ground for all kinds of theories.
Disintegration of the communist camp marked the end of
the Cold War and led to dismemberment of the communist
empires into a number of new states. As a part of a new redis-
tribution of political forces, West-European leftist intellectuals
have reanimated fascism as an old-new menace to the global
order and democracy. In place of the red menace the black
one was rekindled. This has made meaningful the presence of
those determined to ‘fight it’ on the political scene; and has
also given the opportunity to the East-European communists
to re-occupy the pre-Cold War positions within the alliance.
Such a return of the struggle between fascists and anti-fas-
cists contributed to an abolition of the latter’s crimes commit-
ted during the era of their communist dictatorships, and pro-
vided a legitimate frame for their political agency. In return, the
European Left has found an ally in promotion of its own inter-
est as well as in the struggle against the uprising and
strengthening of the nation-states. If fascism was absent
somewhere, it should have been invented, because there is
no anti-fascism without fascism. Without questioning the
worth of the Yugoslav anti-fascist movement from July 1941
till April 1945, it is necessary to warn about an invented anti-
fascism the purpose of which is to realise the national
(wartime) goals. Such a quasi-antifascism was promoted
especially in Serbia, but also in many parts of the BiH. The
Serb political and military leadership tried to justify their war-
conquests by an alleged struggle against ‘Croatian and
Slovenian fascists and separatists.’ In 1991 autumn, in the
surroundings of Knin, a JNA officer, Ratko Mladic, with a red
star on his beret, was threatening the ultimate struggle against
‘Ustashas and other fascists’. He ended his ‘anti-fascist’ strug-
gle five years later in Srebrenica where he replaced the red
star with a ‘skull and crossbones’ [a Chetnick mark]. Similarly,
























and crossbones’ on their berets killed a hundred of Croat pil-
grims returning from Knin. That date was later officially
declared the day of antifascist uprising that ended with the
massacre of prisoners of war and civilians in May 1945; again
they just replaced their ‘skull and crossbones’ with ‘red stars.’
Such historical facts can in no way excuse or relativise the
atrocities committed by Ustashas, or the fascist regime that
Ustashas established.
Such facts, however, can pertinently illustrate both the ide-
ology that Pascal Bruckner calls ‘the ideology of antifascism’
and inconsistency of the communist ‘antifascists’ who have
never distanced themselves, let alone regretted, the crimes
committed in the name of communism, or ‘antifascism.’ This
also substantiates Istvan Bibó’s view that, on the Southeast of
Europe, there was not a nation who managed to place their
own politics above one’s own territorial aspirations and narrow
national interests; no nation was fascist or antifascist in itself
and all the nations were embracing either fascism or democ-
racy according to some potential benefits.
Leaning on the previous claim, the Serb elite is investing
a maximum effort to maintain Republika Srpska (RS). Their
estimate is that, under the circumstance, the best way of
achieving such a goal is to insist on ‘consistent implementa-
tion’ of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which turned from a
‘devilish plan of destruction of the Serb people’ into a Holy
Writ that can’t be changed without a consent of all. The Serb
elite would not want to change a bit, especially not if such a
change jeopardised their current position. A good part of the
Serb ruling elite, which is grouped around SDS, has no sym-
pathies or respect for the victims of both their politics and the
ethnically cleansed RS. Even if they have not taken an active
part in the crime, they nonetheless embraced it as the means
to solve their however rightfully raised national question, and
the crime marks both the elite and the republic they represent.
The roots of both the crime that reached its most brutal
peak in Srebrenica, and of the Serb ruling elite, date back to
the World War Two. The contrast between Maribor 1945 death
rows, on the one hand, and Srebrenica 1995 death rows, on
the other, parallels the contrast between Milan Basto, or Simo
Dubajić in 1945, on the one hand, and Ratko Mladić, or Simo
Dubajić in 1991, on the other; the contrast parallels the con-
trast between Simo the antifascist and Simo the fascist.
Antifascism as practiced by the RS implies rehabilitation of
Draža Mihailović and the Chetnick movement, and their
renewed identification with partisans and continuity with the
RS war veterans. That is how the things are being put in their


























Foreigners help such a process; for instance, an American
delegation is supposed to come soon to Belgrade to give ‘the
legion of merit’ to the respected ‘antifascist’ Draža Mihailović
executed by a shooting squad composed of the other antifas-
cists. At the same time Christian Amanpour, CNN’s corre-
spondent and a spouse of a former Clinton’s spokesman,
opposed the beatification by Pope John Paul II of cardinal
Alojzije Stepinac on the ground that the cardinal was alleged-
ly ‘close to the Ustasha regime.’ It is fascinating to see the
amount of effort invested into restoration of the state of mind
characteristic of ‘the golden Yugoslav age’ in this region
(which is a synonym for Yugoslavia).
A part of Bosniac, and even Croat, intelligentsia that was
born during that ‘golden age’ frequently interprets certain
processes and phenomena as ‘fascism.’ One can only guess
whether such an interpretation betrays a special sensitivity for
democracy and human rights, or just replicates a jargon and
implies labelling of an opponent to disqualify him/her. In any
case, such labelling also implies relativisation of the name of
the evil, which diminishes its true significance and suppress-
es its essence. Croats and Serbs from within the so-called
civic political elite of Sarajevo represent a special relict of such
a ‘golden age’ and a unique social and political phenomenon
of ‘our region.’ They are best exemplified by the SDA nominee
for the ‘Serb’ vice-president of the BiH Federation, Desnica
Radivojević, or for the ‘Croat’ deputy mayor of SDA’s ‘multi-
ethnic’ administration of Sarajevo, Josip Jurišić, or by some
earlier ‘japonica’-politicians like Ivo Komšić or Miro Lazović
who had no political or social influence. In the 1980s and
1990s they were able to see the direction of political develop-
ments, but decided to remain ‘deaf and blind’, because certain
disclosures would have jeopardised their ‘flowery’ positions.
Even when they disclosed something, that was only post
facto, too late to change anything, but enough to free them
from any responsibility. Hence they should not wonder why
they have been dismissed or considered unimportant. The
Croats and Serbs who advocate a unitary BiH believe that,
within such a state, they would take the role of a chosen elite
to represent the Serb and Croat ‘masses’, the way they did in
Yugoslavia or Socialist Republic of BiH, which would subse-
quently secure both their social positions and a source of
finance.
The small urban population rewarded their political
engagement by calling them ‘honourable citizens’, whilst the
Constitution stipulated the need for their service (through an
ethnic key). That is how the Bosnian feudal system was

























cession of government in Sarajevo, Ivo Komšić, the president
or vice-president of the BiH Communist Union, of HSS, HNV,
SDP, SDU…has probably lost his office; the public says about
him that he moves from one to another political track so fast
that they fear that a car will strike him. And, perhaps, following
an initiative to replace the rotating BiH Presidency with a sin-
gle BiH President, Miljenko Brkić, a former president or a high-
ranked official of BiH Communist Union, of HDZ and
HNZ…could take the office. He adopted as his own the idea
of such a replacement that was voiced forty days ago by
Sulejman Tihić, and now keeps promoting it wholeheartedly. It
is difficult not to be mean and to think that Brkić’s calculation
is as follows: as he cannot run for the Presidency members,
perhaps by promotion of such an idea he could grab a posi-
tion within the office of the next president; or, if the powers to
elect the president are allocated to the Parliament, then, being
acceptable by Bosniacs, he might have the chance of being
elected…?
Perhaps such thinking is flawed; perhaps this is a noble
and wise idea that evades a common man’s understanding;
however, with such cases in mind, one should not find it
strange that the gap between ‘a common man’ and a BiH
Croat politician is increasingly wide. Whereas in mid-19th cen-
tury Fr Ivan Frano Jukić, on behalf of all the Bosnian
Christians, requested from Port to stop calling them ‘raya’,
today’s Croat and Serb ‘civic’ elite requests from the public to
treat them as ‘raya’, not as dummies. To illustrate their current
position, one can use a passage from Ivo Andrić’s ‘Travnička
Hronika’ [translated into English as ‘Bosnian Chronicle’ or
‘The days of consuls’], which narrates about the day when the
Travnik urban population makes up a drunk Bekri-Mustapha
and dresses him as a noble and honourable Moslem just to do
a nasty thing to Mehmed Brka, an employee in the French
Consulate, because he ‘was in service of an infidel and eating
pork.’
In contrast to the 19th century’s French and Austrian con-
suls, today Europe is represented in Bosnia through an
English lord Paddy Ashdown, a High Representative who is a
sovereign ruler of Bosnia. The lord has not become a celebri-
ty in Bosnia through the many affairs in which he was involved
in his country, as Herzegovinians and Bosnians then had
much more important things their minds were occupied with.
The BiH public opinion did not mind his comradeship with
Radovan Karadzic in 1992 either, as Karadzic’s HQs were a
normal destination of Ashdown’s predecessors, lords
Carrington and Owen. Ashdown came into the focus of public



























tary-police action ‘Storm’, when he organised a press confer-
ence at which he was frenetically waving with a serviette that
contained a quasi-draw of division of the BiH of which he
alleged that, three months before the press conference, the
Croatian President Franjo Tudjman drew it himself. It was
through such a low, spy-mastered and deceitful forgery that
Ashdown became an idol of a part of both BiH and Croatian
public. Hence a part of the public welcomed his engagement
in the BiH with enthusiasm.
As time was passing by, it became increasingly clear that
a small cheat was turning into a big one, and that the lord
would not solve any of the BiH problems; on the contrary, they
were about to grow bigger and bigger. Perhaps today, in April
2005, ten years after the show of ‘serviette’, when in Belgrade
Ashdown states that ‘nobody will dismantle Republika
Srpska’, some will get a clear picture about what is going on
here. Whatever happens next, as soon as this fall Ashdown
will be visiting London clubs, or various commissions, founda-
tions, and Stiftungs, like his predecessor Wolfgang Petritsch
or his Principal Deputy Donald Hays, to advance the claims
that the Dayton Agreement is a straitjacket, that the BiH is just
a façade of a state, and that ‘there in Balkans’ it is impossible
to bring an order.
It is interesting to note that Hays’ analysis is not bad, that
he has succeeded to diagnose the main problems of the BiH.
He also claims that responsibility for such a situation should
be taken by the BiH political elite (with small ‘e’) who aims to
retain both economic and overall social power in their hands.
Such elite preserve themselves by preserving the existing
relationships and by conserving the current division and isola-
tion of the country. However, it remains unclear why Hays did
not say such things whilst he was working in the BiH, and why
he, with all his powers, did not do something to change the sit-
uation. At the same time, the designer of the ‘straitjacket’,
Richard Holbrooke, claims that Balkans is facing a danger of
another war. The CIA is making the same prediction, expect-
ing that another war will break out within the next fifteen years.
Let us hope that this will not happen, but if it happens, this
time nobody should be caught by surprise; nobody would
have the right, first, to say that the peoples and citizens of
Bosnia-Herzegovina have gone mad, and, secondly, to flee
the country and return after the madness is over in order to
teach a lesson about morality, humanity, or whatever.
If another war breaks out, the Bosnian-Herzegovinian
elites will have to take blame for it, no matter how small ‘e’ in
‘elites’ be; English lords, American retired generals, and

























Those who refuse to solve the problems so clearly identified,
or who do not see the problems so identified, will have to take
blame. The responsibility and guilt will be on those who are
dismantling themselves, who are dismantling the Federation,
the RS, the BiH Presidency, cantons…with an awareness
that, once they dismantle themselves, the others will fall too,
or that, when they win, the others necessarily lose and vice
versa.
The guilt will be on them, as it is, when it comes to the last
war, on the pre-war elites: the communist leaders who have
managed to destroy an embryo of civil society and of civil
elite, without creating a new one, the communist politicians
who were more nationalists than communists, and more
opportunists and demagogues than anything else, those who
were stealing from the working class the avant-garde of
which they portrayed themselves to be, those who were
building summer-houses in Neum and Pale, those who
cared only about their own comfort instead of tackling the
problems of the society, the scholars who were wasting their
intellects on the study of an influence of Marx’s philosophy on
traffic or on cotton-growth without being able to see the com-
ing end of the Marxist Utopia; the journalists who were poi-
soning the public opinion with the committees’ absurdities,
the Croat, the Moslem and the Orthodox priests who have
(however temporarily) neglected ‘The Kingdom of Heaven’
and adhered to the communist-atheist Princedom, having
thought that it would be better to both themselves and the
people. And, then, the guilt is on them all together, because,
after the fall of the communist system, they have all overnight
turned into radical anti-communists, and tried to place all the
blame for past sins on ‘the others’, multiplying thus the evil
itself.
The key question that needs to be posed today in Bosnia-
Herzegovina was posed two centuries ago in the verses of
Abdulvehabib Ilhamija: What one wants, for God’s sake? If
one wants to change the condition of the BiH then it is neces-
sary to change its elite because they feed on lies and have the
goals that differ from those publicly stated. But, as the work-
ers in shipyards, mines, and factories, were the only ones with
the power to dethrone both communism and the communist
elite who ruled on behalf of the workers, by shattering the
foundations of their legitimacy, the same applies today –
today’s criminal and non-democratic, quasi-national elites of
Bosnia-Herzegovina could be dethroned only by those on
whose foundations such elites rely to portray themselves as
‘legitimate’ defenders of the national interests, that is, by true


























How to achieve such a goal? First, we should stop lying to
each other, stop lying to Europe, and stop talking only things
that the others like to hear. The need to introduce the Truth
into political and public discourse in the BiH, without minding
about political correctness, or about dominant theories and
trends, was never more pressing than today. An open and
honest debate, through which a general consensus about fun-
damental social values will be achieved, is needed. Interests
need to be clearly defined within the frame of such values,
and political goals should then be set on the foundation of
such interests. In the course of such a debate, the people able
to develop mutual trust, and to solve their problems, will come
to the forefront. Otherwise, we will be growing increasingly
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– A Personal View
Abstract
Who is today’s elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina? Who are the chosen, the
principals and the most influential and dignified ones? Who has got
the power? Who is the crème of the society? Numerous authors offer
theoretical lenses through which an answer to such questions can be
sought, including Wright Mills, Vilfred Pareto, Mirko Kus Nikolajev,
and Djuro Kovačević. One can also internalise the theory of a new
post-capitalist elite proposed by Alexander Bard and Ian Söderqvist,
the key point of which is that ‘the submissive ones shall not inherit
the Earth;’ the power and glory are belonging to those who are work-
ing hard, who are recognising the changes and promoting their own
interests, but who are also lucky enough to be blessed by a particular
direction of historical developments. We can perhaps choose one of
the many definitions of elite, for instance: elite is the part of society in
possession of power, the part able to realise its will and impose it on
the others. Hence elite has the power, government, and authority. In
this paper I will not refer to all those men and women who have self-
lessly contributed to the community, the people, or the state. I will not
refer to the many cases of sacrifice and courage either. I will only try
to sketch briefly the issues pertaining to the origins and evolution of
the elite in Bosnia-Herzegovina and to point to causal pathways of
such issues.
